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Abstract
In the economic literature on market competition, ﬁrms are often modelled as
individual decision makers and the internal organization of the ﬁrm is neglected
(unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation
suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent
to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are
models of team-organization such that team-ﬁrms and individual ﬁrms are behav-
iorally equivalent. This provides a theoretical foundation for the unitary player
assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in
experiments, which is in contrast to experimental results on price competition.
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1.1 The Unitary Player Assumption in Cournot Oligopoly
In the economic literature on market competition such as Bertrand or Cournot compe-
tition, ﬁrms are modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization
of the ﬁrm is neglected. This is known as the unitary player assumption. In contrast,
studies of the theory of the ﬁrm (e.g. Hart, 1995) and personnel economics (e.g. Lazear,
1995, Prendergast, 1999) focus extensively on the internal organization of the ﬁrm but
the market environment is considered just in a very stylized form. In quantity compe-
tition a l` a Cournot, teams may not display the same behavior as individuals. This is
illustrated by the literature on strategic delegation in Cournot oligopoly, where the dele-
gation of a principal to a manager leads to revenue maximization of the ﬁrm rather than
to proﬁt maximization (see Vickers, 1985, Fershtman and Judd, 1987). This example
shows that the theoretical behavior of the ﬁrm depends crucially on the model of inter-
action within the team/ﬁrm. Thus from a theoretical point of view, the unitary player
assumption in Cournot competition must be questioned. Is there any organizational form
of the ﬁrm in a Cournot oligopoly, which generates behavior that is equivalent to the
behavior of an individual decision maker? Fortunately, as we show in Section 2, this
question can be answered in the aﬃrmative. There do exist models of ﬁrm organizations
in Cournot oligopoly generating behavior that is equivalent to an individual decision
maker. This provides a theoretical foundation of the unitary player assumption in the
Cournot oligopoly. For example, we consider a Cournot oligopoly where members of each
ﬁrm choose eﬀorts. For simplicity, the eﬀorts of the members in each ﬁrm are aggregated
additively to the quantity of the ﬁrm. We consider two diﬀerent regimes of distributing
the ﬁrm’s proﬁts among its members. First, proﬁts may be distributed equally per head,
an arrangement that may correspond loosely to a co-operative like an Israeli Kibbutz or a
German Genossenschaft. Second, proﬁts may be distributed proportionally according to
each member’s costly eﬀort. We show that in both cases the Nash equilibrium quantities
1of the ﬁrms are equivalent to the Nash equilibrium in an analogous Cournot oligopoly in
which each ﬁrm is an individual decision maker. The question is whether there is also
empirical evidence for the behavioral equivalence of the two models of team-ﬁrms and
the Cournot oligopoly with individual ﬁrms. We study experimentally this behavioral
equivalence and ﬁnd support for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition.
1.2 Related Literature
Our ﬁndings are in direct contrast to recent analogous experimental results on price
competition between teams. Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu and Selten (2006) building on
previous work by Bornstein and Gneezy (2002) test for the unitary player assumption
in Bertrand duopoly. In this study, the organizations of the ﬁrms are analogous to ours.
However, instead aggregating the eﬀorts to quantities, individual prices are aggregated
additively to the ﬁrm’s price. In their setting the equilibrium predictions are identical
for both individual ﬁrms and team-ﬁrms. Yet, in their experiment they clearly reject
the unitary player assumption as teams are more competitive than individual ﬁrms. We
provide a discussion of what we believe drives the diﬀerences in Section 4.
An early experimental study investigating quantity competition between ﬁrms con-
sisting each of a group of subjects is Sauermann and Selten (1959), who consider an
asymmetric 3-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly, in which each ﬁrm is represented by ﬁve subjects
on average. Those subjects play diﬀerent roles: some communicate with the “market
central oﬃce”, others keep the books of the ﬁrm, etc. It is a dynamic problem because
ﬁrms can borrow money for production and have to pay interest. Subjects play it over 30
periods. During the play, ﬁrms can acquire information about other ﬁrm’s market share,
debt etc. Sauermann and Selten (1959) report results that are remarkably close to one of
the asymmetric Cournot Nash equilibria of the stage game under complete information.
The aim of their study was not so much on testing Cournot’s theory but on replicating a
“realistic” yet controlled decision environment in order discover how subjects make deci-
sions. In contrast, we aim to conduct a less complex experiment. Consequently we have
2more experimental control over the internal organization of the ﬁrm, i.e., the aggregation
of decisions and the distribution of proﬁts. Huck, M¨ uller and Normann (2004) conduct
an experiment to test strategic delegation a l` a Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd
(1987) in Cournot oligopoly. Theory predicts that ﬁrms set output levels well above the
Cournot Nash equilibrium in order to maximize revenues instead proﬁts. Yet, they ﬁnd
output levels similar to the Cournot Nash equilibrium. Together with our experimental
ﬁndings we conclude that the Cournot outcome appears to be quite robust for ﬁrms that
are represented by teams and engage in quantity competition no matter whether or not
the Cournot outcome is the equilibrium prediction for such structure.
Nabantian and Schotter (1997) examine the inﬂuence of diﬀerent incentive schemes
on the production in teams. Among the incentive schemes they consider are also those
analyzed in our study, namely the distribution of proﬁts per head and the proportional
distribution. They also aggregate decisions of subjects inside the ﬁrm additively, which
is followed in our study as well. However, their work is restricted to an individual ﬁrm
production problem. This leaves out completely strategic reasons for diﬀerences between
behavior of teams and individuals. A ﬁrm’s behavior is not just inﬂuenced by its internal
organization but also by the opponents’ reaction to the ﬁrm’s internal organization. Our
experiment allows to test for such strategic sources of potential violations of the unitary
player assumption (see Observations 3 and 4).
Experiments on group versus individual behavior are an active and growing ﬁeld of
research. Bornstein (2007) provides a recent systematic survey and points out gaps in
the literature. Most of the studies in the literature show that some relevant aspects of
team behavior may be diﬀerent from behavior of individuals. In contrast, we show with
our study that there are decision making situations where the average behavior of groups
and the average behavior of individuals are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. It is a worthy task
for this ﬁeld of research to identify classes of decision making situations and aspects of
behavior in which groups (do not) diﬀer from individuals, and if possible explain why
such diﬀerences (do not) occur. To this extend, it may be helpful to consider in more
theoretical detail the internal structure of teams and its eﬀect on the interaction between
3teams. A useful classiﬁcation of diﬀerent types of teams is provided by Bornstein (2007).
He distinguishes between unitary teams on one hand - i.e. a team who can reach a binding
agreement on a joint strategy - and non-cooperative teams - i.e. a team whose members
act independently without binding agreements. In this article, we are only concerned
with the latter kind of teams.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the experimental design and
procedures. The experimental results are described in Section 3. We conclude with a




Our model of market competition is a symmetric 3-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly in which every
ﬁrm faces the linear inverse demand function






j=1 qj is the sum of all ﬁrms’ quantities qj ∈ R, j = 1,...,3. Each ﬁrm has
unit marginal costs, i.e. c(qj) = qj for all qj ∈ R. The proﬁt function of ﬁrm j = 1,2,3
is given by
πj(qj,q−j) = (p(Q) − 1)qj, (2)
where q−j =
P
h6=j qh denotes the sum of quantities of ﬁrm j’s opponents.
Let Fj be the set of members of ﬁrm j. Each ﬁrm j = 1,2,3 is viewed as a team of
members ij ∈ Fj. Member ij of ﬁrm j chooses the eﬀort level eij ∈ R. For all treatments,
qj =
P
ij∈Fj eij. That is, the quantity of each ﬁrm is the sum of its members’ eﬀorts.
We chose a 3-ﬁrm oligopoly rather than a duopoly because collusion occurs sometimes
in duopolies but rarely in oligopolies with more than two ﬁrms (see Huck, Normann and
4Oechssler, 2004, and the discussion in Section 4). On the other hand, an oligopoly with
more than 3 ﬁrms would require a larger number of subjects.
The four treatments outlined below diﬀer in their models of the internal organization
of the ﬁrm. In particular the incentive structure varies across treatments. However, the
parameters are chosen such that there is a behavioral equivalence between ﬁrms and
individual decision makers in theory (see Table 1).
Treatment C
Treatment C is a (C)ontrol-treatment with a standard 3-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot oligopoly.
Each ﬁrm corresponds to an individual member (i.e., a unitary player) such that each
individual’s eﬀort corresponds to a ﬁrm’s quantity. The payoﬀ function of each individual
is simply the proﬁt function of her ﬁrm (equation (2)).
Treatment SP
Treatment SP is a treatment with (S)ymmetric ﬁrm-size and (P)roportional incentives.
Each ﬁrm has three members, i.e., Fj = {1j,2j,3j}, for all ﬁrms j = 1,2,3. Every
member faces identical linear costs of eﬀorts k(eij) = 831
6eij, that are chosen such as
to yield a behavioral equivalence between individuals in treatment C and teams in this
treatment in equilibrium (see Table 1). Moreover, every member is entitled to a share
of his ﬁrm’s proﬁt that is proportional to his eﬀort level. That is, the payoﬀ function of










h6=i ehj is the sum of the other members’ eﬀorts in the same ﬁrm j.
Note that treatment SP is equivalent to a standard nine-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly with
marginal cost k + c. Thus, the treatment allows us also to check whether the framing of
three players lead to deviations from the Cournot Nash equilibrium.
At the ﬁrst glance, the treatment appears to be contrived by the additional eﬀort
5costs k for each member of a ﬁrm. Doesn’t it add extraneous structure to the original
Cournot oligopoly? Yes, it does add structure, which is usually neglected in the standard
models. The eﬀect of such internal structure is what we want to study here. If such eﬀort
cost wouldn’t be added in this treatment, then a diﬀerence between observed behavior
in treatments SP and C wouldn’t be surprising and predicted by Nash equilibrium. The
next two treatments do not require extra eﬀort costs of the members but the proﬁts of
each ﬁrm are not allocated proportionally across members.
Treatment SH
Treatment SH is a treatment with (S)ymmetric ﬁrm-size and an equal allocation of a
ﬁrm’s proﬁts per (H)ead. The treatment is analogous to treatment SP except for the
distribution of ﬁrm-proﬁts and the eﬀort costs. Eﬀort costs k(eij) = 0 are nil so as to
obtain a theoretical behavioral equivalence between individual ﬁrms and team ﬁrms (see








That is, proﬁts of the ﬁrm are allocated equally across members of the ﬁrm and this
allocation is independent of any member’s eﬀort.
Note that in this treatment (as well as in treatment AH below) any distribution of
eﬀorts among members adding up to the Cournot Nash equilibrium quantity of the ﬁrm
is a Nash equilibrium. Thus this treatment allows us to investigate the impact of an
intra-ﬁrm coordination problem on the quantity of the ﬁrm and the market outcome. In
comparison with treatment SP, we can evaluate the eﬀect of two diﬀerent rules of proﬁt
distribution among members of a ﬁrm. Again, we have in this treatment a theoretical
behavioral equivalence between individual ﬁrms and team-ﬁrms (see Table 1).
Treatment AH
Treatment AH is a treatment with (A)symmetric ﬁrm-size and an equal allocation of
proﬁts per (H)ead. The treatment is analogous to treatment SH except for the diﬀerent
6sizes of the ﬁrms. Firm 1 consists just of a individual member, whose eﬀort corresponds
to the quantity of ﬁrm 1. Firm 2 and 3 have three members each as in treatment SH
before. Consequently, the payoﬀ functions of each member diﬀer depending on whether








πj(qj,q−j),j = 2,3. (6)
This treatment with asymmetric team-size allows us to study the eﬀect of diﬀerent team-
sizes on the competition within markets. Together with the treatment SH, treatment
AH enables us to analyze ﬁrst, whether individuals behave diﬀerently towards team-
ﬁrms than towards other individual ﬁrms, second, whether team-ﬁrms behave diﬀerently
in markets with individual ﬁrms than in markets with other team ﬁrms only, and third,
whether the number of members per ﬁrm has any inﬂuence on results.
Table 1 provides an overview of prominent outcomes such as the unique (symmetric)
Nash equilibrium, the collusive outcome and the competitive outcome1, revealing the
theoretical behavioral equivalence between those treatments. The calculations are stan-
dard and thus omitted. Note again, that in treatments SH and AH there is a continuum
of Nash equilibrium eﬀorts since every distribution of eﬀorts over members of a ﬁrm that
sums up to the Nash equilibrium quantity of the ﬁrm is a Nash equilibrium eﬀort level.
Thus players face a co-ordination problem within each ﬁrm with more than one player.
The table reports just the symmetric Nash equilibrium eﬀort level. Note further, that
due to the individual eﬀort costs in treatment SP, the collusive and the competitive level
from the individual’s view diﬀers from those corresponding levels from the ﬁrm’s view.
Thus the theoretical behavioral equivalence between treatments SP and C is restricted
to the Cournot Nash equilibrium.
1In the competitive outcome, the ﬁrm does not perceive any inﬂuence on the price.
7Table 1: Behavioral equivalence across treatments
Treatments
Outcomes SP SH AH C
Nash equilibrium
Individual eﬀort 249.5 249.5a 249.5a,b / 748.5c 748.5
Firm’s quantity 748.5 748.5 748.5 748.5
Market quantity 2245.5 2245.5 2245.5 2245.5
Collusive outcome
Individual eﬀort 1661




a,b / 499c 499
Firm’s quantity 499 / 415.83d 499 499 499
Market quantity 1497 / 1247.5d 1497 1497 1497
Competitive outcome
Individual eﬀort 3322




a,b / 998c 998
Firm’s quantity 998 / 831.67d 998 998 998
Market quantity 2994 / 2495d 2994 2994 2994
a symmetric outcome
b eﬀort of a member in three-member ﬁrm
c eﬀort of a member in the individual-member ﬁrm
d from the individual’s point of view
2.2 Experimental Procedure
Motivated by previous Cournot experiments in the literature (e.g. Huck, Normann and
Oechssler, 1999), the game in each of our treatments was played repeatedly for 40 rounds
with ﬁxed matching. We chose ﬁxed matching over random matching because ﬁrst, we
wanted to enable subjects to learn, and second, the lab had just 18 terminals available
so that eﬀect of “reshuﬄing” each of the 9 subjects in a market is limited. It is also
known that collusion occurs rarely in Cournot tripolies even with ﬁxed matching (see
Huck, Normann and Oechssler, 2004). We chose 40 rounds mainly because on one hand,
experiments on Cournot oligopoly in the literature (e.g. Huck, Normann and Oechssler,
1999) ﬁnd 40 rounds suﬃcient for learning. On the other hand, we did not want to extent
8the duration of the experiment to more than 21
2 hours.
Each subject had to choose her eﬀort level from the grid {0,0.1,0.2,...,x}, whereby x
was ﬁxed at 1500 in treatment SP, SH and AH (for subjects in three-member ﬁrms) and
at 4500 in treatment C and AH (for subjects in individual member ﬁrms). The grid was
chosen such to make all prominent outcomes feasible and allow also for the monopoly
outcome in every treatment.
Each session consisted of three stages: the brieﬁng stage, the interaction-stage, and
the debrieﬁng stage. Stages 2 and 3 were computerized in the experimental software
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
In the brieﬁng stage, subjects received written instructions that were read aloud by
the experimenter. In the appendix, we include as an example an English translation of the
German instructions for treatment SP, which we consider the most complex instruction
among all treatments. The instructions describe the game as well as the details of the
session. The game was indeed framed as competition among ﬁrms as presented in this
article. The demand function, costs functions, eﬀort costs, the proﬁt-distribution and
team-sizes were public knowledge.
The appendix provides an example of a screen-shot. Such an example was also pre-
sented and explained to subjects in the instructions. Subjects were encouraged to ask
questions about the instructions, which some did. Answers were given publicly. After
the instructions, an example was computed in front of the subjects by the experimenter
to enhance the subjects’ understanding of the incentives. After that, each subject had to
take a simple test that required the calculation of ﬁrm-proﬁts and member-payoﬀs.2 Sub-
jects had a standard calculator available. Only after all subjects successfully completed
the test, the interaction stage was started.
In the interaction stage, subjects had to play the game repeatedly for 40 rounds.
Since the aim of our experiment was not to analyze the impact of limited computational
2The values in the examples did not correspond to any prominent value in the game. There was also
no evidence that in the experiment subjects started out with the values of the examples.
9capabilities on outcomes, we provided the subjects with three diﬀerent “trial”-calculators
(see the screen-shot in the appendix). Similar calculators have been employed in previ-
ous experiments on Cournot oligopoly (see for instance Huck, Normann and Oechssler,
1999). It was understood from the instructions that the inputs in those calculators have
no inﬂuence on their payoﬀs from the experiment. First, there was a calculator (2a)
that automatically computed the member’s payoﬀ if she inserted a number each for her
own eﬀort, the total eﬀort by other members of the team and the total quantity of
opponent-ﬁrms (the “trial calculator”).3 Second, there was a calculator (2b) that auto-
matically computed the member’s best response and proﬁt if she inserted a number each
for the total eﬀort by other members of the team and the total quantity of opponent
ﬁrms (the “best-reply calculator”). Subjects could try out as much as they wanted and
the computed payoﬀs were listed below the calculators respectively. Those lists were
automatically deleted after each round. However, all entries to the calculators have been
recorded by the experimenter automatically. Third, there was a standard calculator on
the computer available. After all subjects in the session had chosen and conﬁrmed their
eﬀort levels, payoﬀs were computed automatically and the next round was started.
All subjects knew what feedback they would receive after each round. Between the
rounds, each subject received feedback information on her own eﬀort, the total eﬀort of
all other members in her ﬁrm (only in treatment SP, SH, and for team-ﬁrms in treatment
AH), and the total quantity of all other ﬁrms in the previous period. Each subject also
received feedback information about her own proﬁt but not about proﬁts of other team-
members or other ﬁrms. This information is for instance suﬃcient for myopic best-reply
learning.4
3The input ﬁelds of the calculator was adjusted to the diﬀerent treatments.
4One can show that the game in each treatment has a potential function. To see this, note that
according to Monderer and Shapley (1996) a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and costs has a
potential function. Notice that treatment SP is equivalent to a 9-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly with linear
costs c + k. Finally, note that each of the treatments SH and AH is equivalent to a 3-person Cournot
game except for the a ﬁxed factor ]F
−1
j in ﬁrm j’s proﬁt function. Yet this factor still allows for the
10The debrieﬁng stage consisted of a computerized questionnaire that asked for the
following information: the major of studies, the term of studies, the gender, whether
the subject participated previously in a lecture on game theory or not, and how the
participant would summarize his/her behavior. At the end of the questionnaire the ﬁnal
payoﬀ converted in EURO was announced to the subject. The exchange rate from the
experimental currency Taler to EURO was announced in the instructions. It varied
between 2500 to 400 Taler per Euro-cent depending on the treatment and the type of
ﬁrm such as to equalize the levels of incentives between subjects in individual ﬁrms and
subjects in team-ﬁrms. If all treatments were conducted with the same exchange rate for
every subject, then any diﬀerences could be due to the diﬀerent level of incentives rather
than to “team” eﬀects. The ﬁnal payoﬀs were paid out to the subjects immediately after
the session concluded.
Finally, we need to mention that losses were possible. Thus subjects could possibly
become bankrupt even with the initial lump sum payment that subjects received upfront.
Indeed, this occurred in a few cases in the early rounds of the experiment in the treatment
SP. In such cases we bilaterally agreed with those subjects on a loan such that they could
continue with the experiment.
3 Results
The experiment was conducted in the Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics in
May 2003. For each treatment, we generated 6 independent observations. (Each market
is one independent observation.) In total 168 subjects participated in our experiment.
According to answers to the questionnaires at the end of each session, about 58% of the
subjects majored in economics, 23% in law, 5% in languages and the rest in history,
communication, political science etc. About 62% of the subjects were undergraduates (3
existence of an ordinal potential. The existence of a potential in each treatment implies that sequential
myopic best-reply converges to the Nash equilibrium in ﬁnite time (see Monderer and Shapley, 1996) in
any of our treatments.
11years maximum). 16% of the subjects where above the 8th semester. The sex ratio was
almost balanced with about 49% female subjects. About 19% of the subjects announced
that they had previously discussed game theory in a course.
Each session took about 2 to 21
2 hours including brieﬁng and debrieﬁng. The payoﬀ
to each student was about 18 Euros on average.
3.1 Market Quantities
Figure 1 presents the average market quantities per treatment for the 40 periods. A ﬁrst
glance suggests that average market quantities are very similar across treatments. Aver-
age market quantities are slightly larger in treatments SH and AH. Figure 1 also reveals
that market quantities are distributed closely around the Cournot Nash equilibrium.
Figure 1: Average market quantities
Table 2 provides the summary statistic for market quantities per treatment. Treat-
12Table 2: Summary statistic of market quantities across treatments
Treatments
SP SH AH C
Average 2224.74 2324.37 2369.05 2243.06
Standard deviation 292.24 396.80 510.10 306.34
St. dev. to Nash equilibrium 290.94 427.96 522.80 306.46
St. dev. to competitive outp. 825.50 / 397.94a 782.11 843.19 813.40
St. dev. to collusion 789.62 / 1024.20a 918.57 1020.00 813.29
a from the individual’s view
ments SH and AH have slightly higher average market quantities than treatments SP and
C. The latter two have also smaller standard errors. The Cournot Nash equilibrium is in
all treatments the best predictor compared to the competitive outcome or the collusive
outcome. However, treatments SP and C deviate less from the Cournot Nash equilibrium
prediction than treatments SH and AH.
Figure 2 displays the market quantities for each of the six markets per treatment for
the 40 periods of the experiments. Again, there are no substantial diﬀerences between
and within the treatments. The market quantities are distributed around the Cournot
Nash equilibrium.
We can not reject the hypothesis that average market quantities in treatment SP
are not diﬀerent from treatment C even at the 0.29 signiﬁcance level with a two-sided
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and at the 0.1 level with a Robust Rank Order test.5 The
same holds for treatment SH versus treatment C. For treatment AH, we can not reject
the hypothesis that average market quantities are not diﬀerent from treatment C at the
0.045 signiﬁcance level with a two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and at the 0.05
level with a Robust Rank Order test. The lower signiﬁcance levels for treatment AH are
5See Siegel and Castellan, 1988, for explanations of all the tests used in this article. Note that 0.1 is
the highest signiﬁcance level in Siegel and Castellan (1988) for the Robust Rank Order test.
13Figure 2: Market quantities per treatment
14probably due to two extreme outliers6 in treatment AH. If we omit these two observations
and compare the 4 remaining average market quantities of AH with the ones of C we
cannot reject a behavioral equivalence at the 0.1 signiﬁcance level.
Observation 1 Average market outputs do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across treatments C,
SP, and SH. For treatment AH signiﬁcance levels are lower than in treatment SP and
SH.
We can not reject the hypothesis that average market quantities in any of the treat-
ments are not diﬀerent from the Cournot Nash equilibrium prediction even at the 0.2
signiﬁcance level (two sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov One Sample test).
Observation 2 Average market outputs do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the total Cournot
Nash equilibrium market output.
According to Table 2, standard deviations are higher in treatments SH and AH than
in treatments SP and C. Indeed, judging by the Figures 1 and 2, the volatility seems
to be higher in treatments SH and AH than in SP and C. This is probably due to the
co-ordination problem subjects faced within each ﬁrm in those treatments. Recall that
any distribution of eﬀorts among members of a ﬁrm that adds up to the Cournot Nash
equilibrium quantity of the ﬁrm is a Nash equilibrium eﬀort. This multiplicity of Nash
equilibrium eﬀort levels presents a coordination problem. Figure 2 may also suggest that
the volatility does not decrease and perhaps even increases in treatment SH and AH.
Could the coordination problem become more severe over time? In treatments SH, AH,
and C there is only one market each where the standard deviation is higher in the last
20 periods than in the ﬁrst 20 periods. In treatments SP there is no market with an
increased standard deviation in the last 20 periods.
6An observation is here deﬁned to be an extreme outlier if the market quantity was above 4000 more
than once in the last 35 periods of the play. At such output levels every player is certain to make large
losses.
15Table 3: Average quantities of team-ﬁrms and individual ﬁrms
Treatments
SH AH C
team ﬁrms 787.42 813.13 n.a.
individual ﬁrms n.a. 742.78 747.69
3.2 Strategic Behavior towards Teams vs. Individual Players
We want to test whether team-ﬁrms in markets with individual ﬁrms behave signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from team-ﬁrms in markets with other team-ﬁrms only. Our experimental design
allows us to control for potential strategic sources of diﬀerences in behavior between
team-ﬁrms and individual ﬁrms. The behavior of a ﬁrm may not just be inﬂuenced by
the internal organization of the ﬁrm itself but also by the internal organization within
an opponent ﬁrm. Notice that treatment AH is more similar to treatment SH than
treatment SP or C. Hence we compare data from team-ﬁrms in treatment AH to team-
ﬁrms in treatment SH instead SP or C. In Table 3 we present the averages quantities
of team-ﬁrms and individual ﬁrms for the relevant treatments. Since we have three
(resp. two) team-ﬁrms per market in treatment SH (resp. AH), we randomly select one
from each market in order to get six independent observations from each treatment. We
can not reject the hypothesis that average quantities of team-ﬁrms in markets with an
individual ﬁrm (treatment AH) are not diﬀerent from average quantities of team-ﬁrms in
markets with other team-ﬁrms only (treatment SH) at the 0.47 signiﬁcance level using a
two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and at the 0.1 level using a Robust Rank-Order
test.
Observation 3 Average quantities of team-ﬁrms in markets with an individual ﬁrm
(treatment AH) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from average quantities of team-ﬁrms in
markets with other team-ﬁrms only (treatment SH).
16Similarly, we also want to test whether individual ﬁrms in markets with team-ﬁrms
behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from individual ﬁrms in markets with other individual ﬁrms
only. To test this, we consider data from individual ﬁrms in treatment AH and compare
these to quantities of individual ﬁrms in treatment C. Whereas in each market of the
treatment AH we have an individual ﬁrm (playing with two other team-ﬁrms), in treat-
ment C we have three individual ﬁrms in each market. For the test, we select randomly
one of the three individual ﬁrms in each market in treatment C. In this way we obtain
six independent observations each for treatments AH and C, which we test for signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences. We can not reject the hypothesis that average quantities of individual
ﬁrms in market with team-ﬁrms (treatment AH) are not diﬀerent to average quantities of
individual-players in markets with other individual ﬁrms only (treatment C) at the 0.35
signiﬁcance level using a two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test and at the 0.1 level
using a Robust Rank Order test.
Observation 4 Average quantities of individual ﬁrms in markets with team-ﬁrms (treat-
ment AH) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from average quantities of individual ﬁrms in
markets with other individual ﬁrms only (treatment C).
3.3 Internal Coordination Problem
As pointed out in Section 2, subjects face a coordination problem in treatments SH
and AH, since any distribution of eﬀorts among members of a ﬁrm that adds up to the
Cournot Nash equilibrium quantity of the ﬁrm is a Nash equilibrium eﬀort.
In treatments SH and AH, the standard errors of the ﬁrm quantities and individual
eﬀorts are higher than in treatments SP and C (Table 4). This might be due to the co-
ordination problem that subjects faced in treatments SH and AH. However, in treatment
AH the standard deviation of subjects in the three-player ﬁrms (191.08) is almost as
high as the standard deviation of subjects in individual ﬁrms (204.13). This calls former
explanation with the co-ordination problem into question since the individual ﬁrm does
not face a co-ordination problem. We also observe that standard errors for team-ﬁrms
17Table 4: Standard errors of ﬁrm quantities and individual eﬀorts
Treatment Individual eﬀort Firm’s quantity
SP 79.44 149.35
SH 121.67 201.27
AH 191.08b 204.13a / 264.72b
C - 162.37
a only 1-player ﬁrms
b only 3-player ﬁrms
in the treatment AH are higher than standard errors for team-ﬁrms in the treatment
SH. The latter are at about the same magnitude as standard errors of individual ﬁrms
in treatment AH. It appears that the heterogeneity of the ﬁrm size in the treatment AH
increases the standard error of quantities of team-ﬁrms.
Standard errors do not decrease during the 40 rounds for a substantial portion of
subjects and ﬁrms. I.e., standard errors for the last 20 rounds are higher for a sizeable
portion of individual ﬁrms and team-ﬁrms across treatments, especially in treatments SH
and AH (about 30% of individual ﬁrms and about 20% of team ﬁrms). This suggests
that the coordination problem is not resolved during the 40 rounds of play.
Our data on individual eﬀorts/quantities suggest some behavioral heterogeneity among
subjects. A way of capturing this heterogeneity is by categorizing diﬀerent types of sub-
jects. We distinguish between aggressive and defensive subjects and ﬁrms. We say a
subject (resp. ﬁrm) is aggressive if 60% of the periods she (resp. it) plays at least 50
(resp. 100) grid-points above the Nash equilibrium level. Similarly, a subject (resp.
ﬁrm) is defensive if 60% of the periods she (resp. it) plays at last 50 (resp. 100) grid-
points below the Nash equilibrium level. Table 5 reveals the distribution of types across
treatments. For individual eﬀorts, treatment SH and AH have a higher percentage of
extreme types compared to SP. Note that in those treatments there were also asymmetric
equilibria involving asymmetric levels of eﬀorts across individuals within the same ﬁrm.
Similarly, treatment SH has more extreme ﬁrms compared to SP, AH, and C. There is not
18Table 5: Types of players
SP SH AH C
Aggressive individual 16.7% 25.9% 25.0% -
Defensive individual 11.1% 35.2% 27.8% -
Aggressive ﬁrms 5.6% 11.1% 2.8%a / 0.0%b 5.6%
Defensive Firms 5.6% 16.7% 2.8%a / 0.0%b 5.6%
a only in 3-player ﬁrms
b only in 1-player ﬁrms
much diﬀerence among the latter three treatments in terms of the distribution of types
of ﬁrms. Remarkably, the percentage of defensive and aggressive types of ﬁrms is almost
equal in each treatment. Note that in a strategic situation like the Cournot oligopoly, the
number of aggressive and defensive ﬁrms may not be independent. It suggests tendencies
towards Stackelberg outcomes.
Observation 5 Treatments SH and AH lead to more asymmetry among individual eﬀort
levels as compared to treatment SP. This is in line with the existence of asymmetric Nash
equilibrium eﬀorts in treatments SH and AH.
3.4 Convergence and Learning
All the results so far concern the average behavior in the experiment. We do not expect
that subjects choose exact equilibrium eﬀorts over all 40 periods. Rather, our design
allows subjects to learn using for instance a myopic best-reply process.
To analyze our data, we say here that a time series of a variable converges to the
Nash equilibrium level if in the last 20 rounds a higher percentage of cases is within a
range of +/−δ around the Nash equilibrium level than in the ﬁrst 20 rounds. We ﬁx δ at
30, 80, and 100 grid-points for the individual eﬀorts, the ﬁrm quantities and the market
quantities respectively.
In Table 6 we report the percentage of cases which do belong to the interval in the
19Table 6: Percentage of cases within the interval around symmetric Nash equilibrium
Treatment Individual eﬀorts Firms’ quantities Market quantities
SP 29.8% / 36.8% 39.2% / 52.5% 31.7% / 54.2%
SH 13.9% / 15.0% 26.7% / 42.5% 23.3% / 27.5%
AH 12.9% / 11.7%a 31.9% / 45.6% 20.0% / 34.2%
C - 45.8% / 57.8% 33.3% / 45.0%
a 3-player ﬁrm
ﬁrst 20 rounds /last 20 rounds
ﬁrst and second 20 periods of the experiment. In almost all treatments (except for the
individual eﬀorts in treatment AH) a larger percentage of cases lies within the interval
in the last 20 periods of the experiment compared to the ﬁrst 20 periods. Whereas about
50% of ﬁrm quantities and market quantities lie in the interval for treatments SP and C,
this is lower in treatments SH and AH. Percentages for individual values are lower than
for ﬁrm and market quantities which is probably due to an averaging eﬀect.
We ﬁnd only weak evidence for myopic best-reply learning across treatment. Figure 3
shows the mean square deviation between each subject’s best-reply and the actual eﬀort
choice per period per treatment. Although the mean square deviation declines over 40
periods, it is still substantial at the end of the 40 rounds.
Observation 6 There is only weak evidence for myopic best-reply learning and conver-
gence to Nash equilibrium levels.
3.5 Calculator Data
One feature of our experimental design is the collection of data calculated by subjects. We
are interested how subjects solve this complex interactive decision problem. To analyze
this question, we like to relate the inputs to the calculators to individual quantities. Do
subjects choose an eﬀort level that they calculated beforehand? Are subjects’ “beliefs”
about opponents correct in the sense that opponents behave as assumed in their previous
20Figure 3: Mean square deviation between best-reply and individual eﬀorts








































calculations? Do subjects search for best or better replies?
On average each subject made about 70 calculations with any of the two calculators
(2a, 2b) during the experiment. This is about 1.75 calculations per head and per period.
Thus subjects spent quite some eﬀorts to solve the interactive decision problem. In about
38.3% of all calculations, subjects used the trail calculator, whereas 61.7% of the time the
best-reply calculator was used. These proportions did not vary much across treatments.
The best-reply calculator was used more often than the trial calculator in all treatments.
The four charts in Figure 4 provide information about the use of calculators. The
upper left chart shows the average number of calculations per head over all 40 periods.
It starts with 5 to 7 calculations per period and falls to 1 to 2 calculators per period after
the tenth period. It appears that treatment C required less calculations than the other







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22chart in the lower left corner answers the question about the percentage of individuals
that played a decision previously calculated. It starts with 50% to 70% and seems to
fall below 50% (in treatment SH even to about 20%). The upper right chart indicates
that only about half of the subjects used their calculations for checking the result of
the previous period. Thus it is unlikely that they consciously used some myopic best-
response adjustment process. Finally, the lower right graph shows that only a small
fraction of individuals used at least one variable that also appeared in the subsequent
period. This fraction does not increase over the 40 periods. If we assume that subjects
try out what they believe opponents will do, then the graph indicates that subjects were
to a large extend unable to correctly anticipate the decisions of others and did not learn
to anticipate other’s decisions.
In the questionnaire at the end of the experiment, we asked subjects to describe
brieﬂy how they reached their decisions. From those descriptions, we got the impression
that many participants use the calculators in their decision heuristics. They may not try
out what they exactly going to play but may bound eﬀorts levels/quantities above and
below.
The time taken for decisions per period decreased from about 200 seconds at the
beginning of the 40 rounds to about 50 seconds after the 10th round, and to about 30
seconds at the end. Almost across all periods these decision times were slightly higher
in treatments SH and AH compared to treatments SP and C.
4 Discussion
Our experimental results on the unitary player assumption in quantity competition a
l` a Cournot are in stark contrast to results by Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu and Selten
(2007), who reject the unitary player assumption in price competition a l` a Bertrand.
What could account for the diﬀerences? There are two focal diﬀerences between the
experiments: the incentive structure and the number of ﬁrms in the market. While one
23may expect the diﬀerent incentive structure to be the most likely culprit, we actually
believe it is mainly due to a number-eﬀect. Formally, the Bertrand duopoly with in-
dividual ﬁrms in Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu and Selten (2007) is a two-player game
whereas their Bertrand duopoly with team-ﬁrms are four or six-player games. There
is quite some experimental evidence (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963, Chapter 10, Dolbear
et al., 1968, and Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000) that Bertrand duopolies tend to collu-
sion whereas Bertrand oligopolies with larger number of players are more competitive.
This holds for ﬁxed matching (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963, Dolbear et al., 1968) as well
as random matching (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000) between the rounds. Given the
experimental evidence on the number eﬀect in Bertrand oligopoly, it may be justiﬁed
to ask whether the diﬀerences found by Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu and Selten (2007)
between the individual setting and the team-player setting can be attributed to a number
eﬀect rather than a team eﬀect. They ﬁnd collusion in the individual Bertrand duopoly
but more competitive prices in team-player Bertrand duopoly. Based on the ﬁndings in
above mentioned experimental literature, we conjecture that in an experiment analogous
to Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu, and Selten (2007) but with a suﬃcient large number of
ﬁrms, one can not reject the unitary player assumption.
A caveat applies to the suggestion that the team eﬀect found in Bertrand by Born-
stein, Kugler, Budescu and Selten (2007) may be due to a number eﬀect. Dufwenberg
and Gneezy (2000, p. 20) sketch a theoretical argument for the number eﬀect in Bertrand
oligopoly based on players’ expectations of opponents’ mistakes, where a mistake is in-
terpreted as a large deviation from the Nash equilibrium price. Players can beneﬁt from
mistakes of opponents which allows them to demand higher prices as well, but the larger
the number of opponents the lower is the probability that all opponents make a mistake.
Such argument does not extend to the team games studied by Bornstein, Kugler, Bude-
scu and Selten (2007) like their “private proﬁt” setting. The reason is that the marginal
expected proﬁt from a price increase may actually (weakly) decrease in the joint proba-
bility of mistakes by members of a player’s own team, while the marginal expected proﬁt
from a price increase (weakly) increases in the joint probability of mistakes by opponents
24in a Bertrand oligopoly. So adding additional team-members to a player’s team may be
beneﬁciary to the player, while adding additional team-members to an opponent’s team
or additional ﬁrms hurts the player. Yet, this line of arguments suggest that eventu-
ally experiments on Bertrand oligopoly with asymmetric team-sizes (analogous to our
treatment AH) are required to disentangle fully the team eﬀect from a number eﬀect.
The arguments by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) do not extend to Cournot oligopoly
without further assumptions. While in Bertrand oligopoly studied by Dufwenberg and
Gneezy (2000) or Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu and Selten (2007) mistakes can only in-
volve higher prices than Nash equilibrium, mistakes in Cournot oligopoly can go in any
direction. Since actions are aggregated within a team (and among opponents), mistakes
may even oﬀset each other. Nevertheless, a number eﬀect has been also reported for
experimental Cournot oligopolies. Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2004) conclude based
on a meta-study of many experiments in the literature as well as additional own exper-
iments that collusion occurs sometimes in duopolies. The stage game Nash equilibrium
seems a good predictor for tripolies. Moreover, collusion appears rarely in oligopolies
with more than two ﬁrms. In our experiment we avoid this number eﬀect (on purpose)
largely because we focus on a Cournot tripoly instead of a duopoly.
We believe that a three-player game is a fairer comparison to a team-player game
than a two-player game because also in terms of the complexity of strategic reasoning
two-player games diﬀer slightly from n-player games, for n ≥ 3. In a two-player game,
each player can reason at most about one other opponent. This is in contrast to n-player
games, where each player may have to reason also about what one opponent reasons
about yet another opponent. In our design, we want to avoid that just the diﬀerence in
the complexity of strategic reasoning between two-player games and team-players games
drives any experimental result.
Huck, Konrad, M¨ uller and Normann (2007) ﬁnd that merged ﬁrms behave signif-
icantly more aggressive than their competitors in experimental Cournot competition.
This could be contrasted with Observations 3 and 4 in Section 3.2. If a team-ﬁrm is
25viewed as a “merged” ﬁrm, then we ﬁnd no diﬀerences in average behavior of merged
and non-merged ﬁrms. Huck, Konrad, M¨ uller and Normann (2007) explain their re-
sult with the merger history and aspiration levels based on pre-merger proﬁts. In their
experiment, subjects experienced the merger during the experiment. In contrast, our
team-ﬁrms do not have any merger experience. We conclude that while we see no diﬀer-
ence between team-ﬁrms and individual ﬁrms, such diﬀerences may arise if subjects do
indeed experience a “merger” into a team-ﬁrm during the experiment.
A Translation of Instructions: Treatment SP
Welcome to the experiment!
In this experiment you can earn money by making decisions. Your earnings will depend on
your decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants. Please read the instructions
carefully. All participants received the same instructions. From now on please do not talk to
other participants anymore. For any questions please do not hesitate to contact us.
You will draw shortly a random number. With this number you will remain anonymous for
us and other participants during the experiment. Please proceed to the cabin in the laboratory
with the same number.
Firms
When arriving at your cabin, you will be matched automatically and randomly with other
participants into a ﬁrm without knowing the other participants. In every ﬁrm there are 3
members (except you there are two other members in your ﬁrm). Each market consist of 3
ﬁrms (except your ﬁrm there are two other ﬁrms in your market). The experiment consists of
40 periods which are followed by a questionnaire. The matching of the participants in ﬁrms
remains the same throughout the 40 periods. Moreover, there are always the same ﬁrms in
a market. In each period each ﬁrm sells a quantity in the market. The costs to the ﬁrm are
1 Taler per quantity. The price per quantity depends on your ﬁrm’s quantity as well as the
quantities of the other two ﬁrms in your market. The higher the quantities in the market, the
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The proﬁt per quantity is the proﬁt of the ﬁrm per quantity. It is calculated as follows:






The proﬁt of the ﬁrm per period is simply the proﬁt per quantity multiplied with the quantity
of the ﬁrm:
26proﬁt of the ﬁrm = proﬁt per quantity × quantity of the ﬁrm
Your decision
In each period each participant has to take a decision about her eﬀort spent in the ﬁrm. The
eﬀort can lie between 0 and 1500 (in steps of 0.1). The costs to each participant per eﬀort is
831
6 Taler. The sum of all eﬀorts over all participants within a ﬁrm is the quantity of the ﬁrm,
which the ﬁrm sells in the market.
quantity of the ﬁrm = sum of eﬀorts of all members within the ﬁrm






sum of eﬀorts of all members
× ﬁrm’s proﬁt
The costs of eﬀort is calculated from the costs per eﬀort of 831




= costs per eﬀort × own eﬀort
The payoﬀ to a participant per period is calculated as follows:
payoﬀ = share on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt − cost of eﬀort
Computer
We use the computer for the input of the decisions, for trying out of decisions and for the
calculation of payoﬀs. Latter is done automatically. At the beginning of each period you can
see the following screen (top left in the corner you can ﬁnd the number of the period):
(1) Values of the previous period
To your information you ﬁnd the values of the previous period at the screen. They are nil in
the ﬁrst period.
(2) Support for Calculations
Second, there are two calculators for trying out possible decisions, which you can use. The
input into the calculators does not inﬂuence your payoﬀs. The calculator left (2a) calculates
the payoﬀ (g) if you put in your possible eﬀort (e), your belief about the eﬀorts of the other
members in your ﬁrm (a) as well as your belief about the quantities of the other ﬁrms (A). After
27the input, the input data will be listed together with the calculated payoﬀ under the calculator
if you press the “calculate” button with the mouse. The eﬀort of the other members in your
ﬁrm (a) is calculated as follows:
eﬀort of other
members of the ﬁrm (a)
= sum of eﬀorts of all other members of the ﬁrm
The quantity of the other ﬁrms (A) is
quantity of other
ﬁrms (A)
= sum of quantities of the other two ﬁrms
= sum of eﬀorts of all members of the other two ﬁrms
The calculator to the right side (2b) calculates your optimal own eﬀort (e∗) and your optimal
payoﬀ (g∗) if you input your belief about the eﬀorts of the other members of the your ﬁrm
(a) as well as your belief about the quantities of the other ﬁrms (A). The optimal own eﬀort
(e∗) is the eﬀort which maximizes your payoﬀ in this period if the other members of your ﬁrm
and the other ﬁrms behave as input by you. Your calculations are listed under the calculator
after you press the “calculate” button with the mouse. At the right side below the calcula-
28tor there is also a button. If you press this button a standard calculator appears on your screen.
(3) Your decision
In (3) you have to choose your eﬀort level. In contrast to the calculators, this input will inﬂuence
your payoﬀ as outlined above. Only after you pressed “OK”, your decision will be conﬁrmed
and the experiments proceeds with the next period. After 40 periods a questionnaire appears
at the screen, which we kindly ask you to ﬁll in.
Your ﬁnal payoﬀ
Since in this experiment there can be losses in a period, you will receive at the beginning an
initial balance of 60 000 Taler. For your ﬁnal payoﬀ we calculate the sum of your initial balance
plus the sum of payoﬀs of all periods. This payoﬀ in Taler will be exchanged into EURO
using an exchange rate of 400 Taler = 1 Cent. This will be paid to you immediately after the
experiment.
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